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In both the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA)1 and the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments of 1977 (EAA)2, Congress strongly de-
nounced American complicity with-and especially American support
for-international boycotts imposed against countries friendly to the
United States. Primary translation: the Arab boycott of Israel.
Since the enactment of these two laws, the so-called "antiboycott
laws," American businesses, and their foreign affiliates, have faced the
unenviable task of interpreting, applying, and complying with a morass
of rules and regulations, some of dubious logic, others of inscrutable
policy. Usually the laws are harmonious, and compliance with one law
results often in compliance with the other. Occasionally, though, the
interplay of the laws lays many traps for the unwary and, inexcusably,
for the knowledgeable as well.
For those readers who become devotees of the subject, there is a
multitude of scholarly explanations available. Some consider the back-
ground of the Arab boycott of Israel, some the political situation that
encouraged the enactment of the laws; others explore the exquisite tax
* Associate, Arent, Fox, Kinter, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.; B.A., with Distinction,
University of Rochester, J.D., George Washington University; Member, District of Columbia and
Maryland Bars.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. Sections 1061-1064 of the TRA added the relevant
I.R.C. sections.
2. Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235. Section 201 of the EAA added section 4A to the Export
Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (amended 1974). Section 4A has
been reinacted with insignificant changes as section 8 of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979).
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planning opportunities left in the wake of the TRA3
This article proposes to set forth at length the requirements im-
posed by the EAA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the
Commerce Department (Part 369 of the Export Administration Regu-
lations; in this article, the EAR)4 and to outline briefly the types of
conduct that, under the TRA and the Guidelines5 written by the Treas-
ury Department, result in the forfeiture of lucrative tax benefits. Fi-
nally, the article offers a few suggestions for establishing a compliance
program to observe both laws.
II. INTERNATIONAL BoYcoTTs DEFINED
A boycott is a refusal to deal with those the boycotter considers his
adversaries. Unionists who refuse to buy goods manufactured by non-
union shops are boycotting their adversaries, the non-union shops.
The Arab states6 consider Israel their adversary. They refuse to
purchase Israeli goods or services, to sell their services or goods to
Israel, or to deal in any manner with companies, nationals, or residents
of Israel. They boycott Israel.
For analytical convenience, this direct refusal to deal with adver-
saries is labeled a primary boycott.
Often a primary boycott is perceived as relatively ineffectual. Af-
ter all, the Israelis do not really need much of what the boycotting Arab
nations have to offer; Israel is highly industrialized and very produc-
tive. Nor do the Israelis need to sell their goods or services to the Arabs
to sustain a healthy economy. The primary Arab boycott of Israel has,
in other words, a mild if at all noticeable economic effect on its target.
To enhance the effects of a primary boycott, a boycotter may re-
fuse to deal with those who support the adversary. Unionists may re-
fuse to purchase goods manufactured by any company that sells its
3. See generally The4rab Boycott andthe InternationalResonse, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
527 (1978); Rubenfeld, Legal and Tax Implications of Partiicpation in International Boycotts, 32
TAx L. REv. 613 (1977); Flynn & McKenzie, International Boycotts, 29 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 139
(1977); and all issues of the BoYcoTr LAW BULLETIN (formerly the ANTI-BoYcoTr BULLETIN),
MIDDLE EAST MONTHLY.
4. 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1979).
5. Department of the Treasury Guidelines, Boycott Provisions ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 43
Fed. Reg. 3454-70 (1978).
6. Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Peoples Democratic Republic of
Yemen. This is the list published by the Treasury Department pursuant to I.R.C. § 999. The
Commerce Department publishes no such list. For the most recent Treasury publication, see 44
Fed. Reg. 57,001 (1979).
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goods to the target of the boycott. Soon enough, all of the target's sup-
pliers will realize that they, strangers to the battle between the boycot-
ters and the target, are suffering. To alleviate the suffering they stop
supplying the target and are reinstated in the good graces of the boycot-
ters.
For similar analytical convenience, this situation is labeled a sec-
ondary boycott.
The Arab nations have for years implemented a secondary boycott
of Israel. American companies that supply goods or services to Israel,
build plants there, or otherwise contribute to the health of the Israeli
economy have become the targets of the secondary boycott. They have
been disqualified from purveying their wares in the Arab nations.
They have been "blacklisted."
If the secondary boycott multiplies the effects of the primary boy-
cott geometrically, a further step, the tertiary boycott, can multiply it
exponentially.
An American company that does not trade with Israel may trade
with other American companies that do. So, for example, an Arab na-
tion may wish to buy widgets, which are manufactured only in the
United States. Widgco makes widgets, but it sells many of them in
Israel; it is, consequently, blacklisted. Broker, a broker of widgets, may
be eligible-not blacklisted-to sell widgets to the Arab buyer. In or-
der to do so, however, it must certify that the widgets it has shipped
were not manufactured by Widgco, the blacklisted manufacturer. The
certification must be made by Broker as a condition of payment; this is
the tertiary boycott, and it becomes self-enforcing.
The tertiary boycott extends beyond this example. If Shipper
sends its trawlers to Israel, Broker may be required to use another ship-
per. Similarly, Insurer may underwrite risks in Israel. Not only will it
be ineligible to underwrite risks in the Arab nations-the secondary
boycott-but it will be unable, due to the tertiary boycott, to insure
Broker's shipment of widgets.
The certification required from Broker may assume many forms.
It may be a statement that Widgco did not make the widgets, that Ship-
per did not carry them, and that Insurer did not insure the shipment. It
may be a certification that no blacklisted manufacturer made, no black-
listed shipper carried, and no blacklisted insurer insured the widgets.
As an economic matter the form is insignificant. The significance lies
1979]
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in the fact that the Arab buyer has, in a sense, deputized Broker for
boycott enforcement purposes.
Certifications are equally useful to the Arab buyer in enforcing the
secondary boycott. "I am not blacklisted," Broker may be required to
certify, "and neither are my parent companies, sisters, subsidiaries,
branches or affiliates."
Certification requirements serve very well as information accumu-
lating devices. When "these widgets were not purchased from a black-
listed manufacturer" is accompanied by "the manufacturer of these
widgets is General Widget Corporation," the obvious message is that
General Widget Corporation does not sell its widgets to Israel or in-
clude Israeli components in its widgets.
Broker, the hypothetical widget seller, may one day receive a boy-
cott questionnaire. It arrives unannounced from the central boycott of-
fice of, for example, Saudi Arabia. It asks a multitude of questions
about Broker's business relationships, its suppliers and customers, and
perhaps even its owners' national origin or nationality, race, religion, or
sex. Broker's answers to these questions provide a wealth of useful in-
formation to the Saudi boycott office. In addition to deputizing Broker
for enforcement purposes, the central boycott office has received the
invaluable services of a volunteer investigative reporter.
It does not require excessive reflection to conclude that the secon-
dary and tertiary aspects of international boycotts intrude severely into
America's domestic economy and foreign policies. Supported by our
sovereign right to control conduct affecting the United States, the an-
tiboycott laws attack those secondary and tertiary aspects.7
It is analytically important to distinguish the information accumu-
lating facets from the refusal to deal aspects of the secondary and terti-
ary boycotts. Recognizing that every nation has the sovereign right to
control its own domestic affairs, neither the TRA nor the EAA prohib-
its Americans from agreeing to sell non-Israeli goods to the Arabs.
There is no feasible way that America could force the Arabs to accept
Israeli goods. But, Americans are prohibited from certifying that the
goods are "non-Israeli;" the negative certification is proscribed. It is an
interesting and probably successful accomodation: Americans may
abide the primary boycott but not more. Serving as information accu-
mulators is unnecessary, because it is sufficient observance of the pri-
7. For the legislative history of the EAA, see general, H.R. REP. No. 95-190, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 362.
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mary boycott to certify in positive form that the goods are of U.S.
origin.
In the grossest sense, the key to understanding the antiboycott laws
is the recognition of the permissibility of primary boycotts and the im-
permissibility of secondary and tertiary boycotts. The specific rules are
discussed below.
III. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
A. In General
The United States has never feared to implement foreign policy
through its export control laws. One example is the Trading With the
Enemy Act of 1917,8 under which the President can declare certain an-
tagonistic nations off-limits as trading partners. Indeed, when the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1969 expired in 1976, President Ford
invoked the Trading With the Enemy Act to continue the antiboycott
reporting program then maintained by the Commerce Department. 9
The great virtue of the export control laws' antiboycott sections is
their restraint. The EAA does not apply unless certain jurisdictional
thresholds are crossed. The persons affected by the EAA are only
"United States persons;" the law applies only to these United States
persons' activities in the "interstate or foreign commerce of the United
States;" and the law proscribes only conduct undertaken "with intent to
comply with, further or support" an unsanctioned international boy-
cott. (There are some sanctioned boycotts, such as the United States
boycott of Rhodesia).
As long as these thresholds are crossed, the EAA prohibits refusals
to deal and transmission of boycott-related information, subject, of
course, to some narrowly drawn exceptions. The EAA also requires
United States persons to report to the Commerce Department the re-
ceipt of "requests" to further or support unsanctioned boycotts.
It is important to remember that the conduct the EAA describes is
prohibited. Severe civil and criminal penalties may be meted out to
violators. The TRA, on the other hand, is inhibitive. It only denies tax
benefits otherwise accruing to those who "participate in or cooperate
with" unsanctioned international boycotts.
Strictly speaking, the EAA is not self-executing. It does not, in
8. Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411.
9. Exec. Order No. 11,940, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,707 (1975).
19791
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itself, proscribe anything. Rather, it directs the President (who has
redelegated the authority to the Secretary of Commerce) to issue regu-
lations prohibiting certain boycott-related conduct. The following dis-
cussion will, therefore, refer exclusively to the EAR, which the author
assumes are unassailable by argument that they impermissibly broaden
the EAA.
B. The Jurisdictional Thresholds
1. United States Persons
One of legal jargon's great catch-all words is "person." For pur-
poses of the EAR it means "any individual, or any association or or-
ganization, public or private, which is organized, permanently
established, resident or registered to do business, in the United States
or any foreign country."'1 It includes the singular and plural where
contextually appropriate. It also includes, for those still doubtful, part-
nerships, corporations, companies, branches, or other organizations or
associations whether or not organized for profit; any government or its
components; any trade association, chamber of commerce or labor
union; any charitable or fraternal organization; and "any other associa-
tion or organization not specifically listed above."'  One does not sus-
pect that the definition of "person" will be frequently litigated.
Much more important is the definition of "United States person."
It includes generally any person who resides in or is a national of the
United States, "domestic concerns," and "controlled in fact foreign
subsidiaries, affiliates or other permanent foreign establishments of do-
mestic concerns."' 2 Domestic concerns are entities organized under the
laws of the United States, any state, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, or any U.S. territory or possession. 13
"Domestic concern" also includes a foreign concern's branch of-
fice, affiliate, partnership or other permanent establishment located in
the United States. 14 To illustrate, the New York branch of a London
bank is a United States person because it is a domestic concern.' 5
The extraterritoriality of the EAR derives from the most complex
definition, concerning foreign entities "controlled in fact" by domestic
10. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(a) (1979).
11. Id.
12. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b) (1979).
13. Id.
14. 15 C.F.tL § 369.1(b)(2) (1979).
15. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b) ex.(iii) (1979).
[Vol. 14:695
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concerns. On this point the EAR should be regarded more as instruc-
tive than exclusive; control is an inherently factual concept not easily
articulated with precision. Thus, the EAR provide various presump-
tions of control in illustrative situations, but admonish that under no
circumstances is control presumed absent. 16
In general terms the EAR state that "'control in fact' consists of
the authority or ability of a domestic concern to establish the general
policies or to control day-to-day operations of its foreign subsidiary,
partnership, affiliate, branch, office or other permanent foreign estab-
lishmnent."' 7
A foreign branch or other unincorporated permanent foreign es-
tablishment is deemed to be controlled in fact. 8 This is the only con-
clusive presumption of control. All others are rebuttable by
"competent evidence."' 9
A domestic concern is presumed to control its foreign subsidiary or
affiliate if:
1. it beneficially owns or controls greater than fifty percent
(50%) of the outstanding voting securities;20
2. it beneficially owns or controls twenty-five percent (25%)
or more of the outstanding voting securities if no other
person owns or controls an equal or larger percentage;2
3. it operates the foreign subsidiary or affiliate pursuant to
an exclusive management contract;22
4. a majority of the directors of the foreign entity are also
directors of the domestic concern;23
5. it has authority to appoint a majority of the directors of
the foreign entity even if the authority is unexercised,24 or
6. it has authority to appoint the foreign entity's chief oper-
ating officer, even if the authority is unexercised.2 5
An option rule regards securities convertible at the holder's option
into voting securities of the foreign entity as owned or controlled by the
holder.26
16. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c) (1979).
17. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(1) (1979).
18. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(5) (1979).
19. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2) (1979).
20. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(i) (1979).
21. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(i) (1979).
22. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(iii) (1979).
23. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(iv) (1979).
24. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(v) (1979).
25. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(2)(vi) (1979).
26. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(4) (1979).
1979]
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What kinds of foreign entities can escape characterization as con-
trolled in fact? The only clear answer is that a foreign concern con-
trolled by an individual is never "controlled in fact" because the
individual is not a "domestic concern."' 7
2. The Interstate or Foreign Commerce of the United States
The EAR apply only to transactions having a minimum nexus
with United States commerce. Nearly all transactions undertaken by
United States persons located in the United States-whether involving
the movement of goods or services within the United States, into the
United States or out of the United States-will be transactions in the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States.28
The EAR do not mention the means or instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce. It may be, accordingly, that the transfer of goods,
services, or information within a state, even by an interstate common
carrier, such as by railroad, motor carrier, telephone or mail, are not
transactions in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States.
The real definitional problems arise in characterizing the activities
of United States persons located outside of the United States. The
EAR divide these activities into three categories: the movement of
goods, the provision of services (including information), and the imple-
mentation of letters of credit.
The disposition of goods acquired by a person outside the United
States from a person in the United States is generally a transaction
meeting the commerce requirement.2 9 This rule does not apply, how-
ever, to goods obtained from the United States that are acquired with-
out reference to a specific order from or transaction with another
person outside the United States and are further manufactured, incor-
porated into, refined into, or reprocessed into another product.3 0
Consequently, all resales of goods obtained from the United States
by trading companies are transactions in the interstate or foreign com-
merce of the United States. If a trading company commingles its
United States source and non-United States source inventory, it is pre-
sumed to resell United States source inventory, so that its resale of any
of that inventory is a transaction meeting the commerce requirement,
27. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c) ex. (xi) (1979).
28. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(1)-.1(d)(2) (1979).
29. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(8) (1979).
30. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(12) (1979).
[Vol. 14:695
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unless at the time of the resale it has sufficient quantities of foreign
source goods on hand to fill the order. Sales by manufacturers of
manufactured items containing parts acquired from the United States
are transactions in United States commerce if the parts were acquired
for the specific job.32
Strictly speaking, goods do not themselves possess a national iden-
tity. If a United States manufacturer sells cars to a British trading com-
pany that resells the cars to a French trading company, resales by the
French trading company do not meet the commerce requirement. Ac-
cording to the EAR, the French company must have acquired the cars
from a "person in the United States," and the British company, even if
a United States person, is not a person in the United States.33
This does not provide an easy loophole, however. Any purposeful
structuring of a multinational company's activities to parallel this result
would surely violate the EAR's anti-evasion section,34 to be discussed
below.
The provision of services acquired by a person outside the United
States from a person in the United States is not a transaction in the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States if the services are
acquired without reference to the specific order from or transaction
with another person outside the United States.35 A United States com-
pany may license its foreign subsidiary to manufacture a patented item.
Sales of this patented item by the manufacturing subsidiary are not
transactions in United States commerce. This presumes that the license
was not acquired for the purpose of filling specific orders, but for gen-
eral business purposes.36
If services are acquired by the foreign subsidiary from its United
States parent to fill a specific order, the EAR first look at the nature of
the services. Services are divided into two categories: ancillary and
non-ancillary. Ancillary services are those provided for the subsidi-
ary's own use, such as legal, accounting, financial, or transportation
services.37 Non-ancillary services are those provided for the direct ben-
efit of the subsidiary's customer, such as a guarantee of the subsidiary's
31. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(8)(iv) (1979).
32. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(9)(i) (1979).
33. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(8) (1979).
34. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 (1979).
35. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(13)(i) (1979).
36. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) ex.(xx) (1979).
37. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(14) (1979).
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performance by its United States parent or engineering services pro-
vided by the parent to enable the subsidiary to complete its obligations
to the customer.38 Presumably, financial services are ancillary unless
money is the commodity being sold; a United States bank can hardly
argue that its provision of funds to its foreign branch that is loaning the
funds is an ancillary service.
What is the result if part of a transaction meets the commerce re-
quirement and part does not? Generally, the whole transaction is con-
sidered to be in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United
States.3 9 The exception is the ancillary services rule: the acquisition of
the ancillary services is in United States commerce, but the remainder
of the transaction is not thereby brought into United States com-
merce.40 The remainder of the transaction may for other reasons sat-
isfy the commerce requirement.
Implementation of a letter of credit by a person located in the
United States is a transaction in the interstate or foreign commerce of
the United States.4' If the person implementing the credit is outside the
United States, the implementation is in United States commerce if the
credit specifies a United States address for the beneficiary, requires
documents indicating shipment from the United States, or calls for doc-
uments indicating United States origin goods.42
3. Intent to Comply with, Further, or Support an Unsanctioned
Foreign Boycott
The intent requirement of the EAR is met, quite simply, when the
reason or purpose for a person's action is to "comply with, further or
support" 43 an unsanctioned boycott.
Reason must be distinguished from motivation. Political or philo-
sophical antagonism for the Arab boycott of Israel may be thought
commendable in some quarters, but its presence or absence is immate-
rial to the EAR. Motivation is not significant in the analysis. Reason
is.
How, though, is reason defined? The EAR do not really define it,
except by example. If a United States person is requested to purchase
cars only from General Motors for resale in Saudi Arabia, the United
38. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(15) (1979).
39- 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(10) (1979).
40. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(3) (1979).
41. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(18) (1979).
42. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(19) (1979).
43. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)(1) (1979).
[Vol. 14:695
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States person may or may not know why the request was made. If it
knows or has reason to know the request was made because Ford is
blacklisted, the intent requirement is met.' If the United States person
is requested only to supply cars, and it purchases only GM cars because
Ford is blacklisted, the intent requirement is met.45 But if it buys GM
cars because it prefers them, the intent requirement is unsatisfied.46
For that matter, the Arab buyer may not want Ford cars because it
dislikes them; that Ford is blacklisted is of no moment, and the intent
requirement is not met.
Knowledge becomes particularly important in examining the in-
tent requirement, especially when a United States person is requested
to furnish information. "Are you the company that built that building
in Jerusalem?" may be a boycott-based question, or it may be an at-
tempt by the Arab buyer to avoid hiring the company that built a
building that collapsed. The builder has to decide whether the request
is boycott-based. He may respond only if he decides it is not-perhaps
an unacceptably risky decision.
"You must certify that the insurance company insuring the ship-
ment is registered to do business in Jordan" may be boycott-based.
Blacklisted insurers are unlikely to be registered in Jordan. This re-
quirement may, however, be unrelated to the boycott. A reasonable
explanation: the buyer wants to know there are assets to attach in the
event of an unsatisfied claim.
While the intent requirement may be the simplest to explain, it's
the most difficult to apply. A useful general rule is that counsel should
presume that any client who asks in advance whether the intent re-
quirement is met has probably met it.
According to the EAR, if any part of the reason for an action is to
comply with, further, or support a boycott, the intent requirement is
satisfied.47 It does not matter that there may also be legitimate business
reasons for the proposed course of action.
C The Prohibitions and Exceptions of the EAR
There are six categories of prohibited actions. Assuming the juris-
dictional thresholds are crossed, no United States person may:
44. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)(6) (1979).
45. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e) ex.(ii) (1979).
46. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e) ex.(i) (1979).
47. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)(1) (1979).
1979]
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1. Refuse or knowingly agree to refuse to do business with
any other person pursuant to an agreement with, a re-
quirement of or a request from or on behalf of a boycott-
ing country.48
2. Discriminate against any other person on the grounds of
race, religion, sex or national origin.4 9
3. Furnish information about any person's race, religion,
sex, or national origin.50
4. Furnish information about its own or any other person's
business relationships with or in a boycotted country or
with any person known or believed to be restricted from
having business relationships with the boycotting coun-
try.5 1
5. Furnish information about any person's support for fra-
ternal or charitable organizations that support the boy-
cotted country.52
6. Implement a letter of credit containing a requirement
prohibited by the first five prohibitions.53
There are also six categories of exceptions. Fundamentally, the
exceptions carve out havens of permissible activity designed to support
the primary boycott. As stated above, the EAR allow United States
persons to comply with or support primary boycott requests, such as
requirements that no Israeli goods be sold to an Arab buyer, princi-
pally because of an appreciation of every sovereign nation's right to
select its own trading partners.
There is another reason, also. It would be self-defeating to outlaw
compliance with primary boycott requests because the Arab buyers
would simply reject Israeli goods or, worse, reject American suppliers
in favor of suppliers who would honor primary boycott requests.
This second reason has a logic and a life all its own. Once it is
recognized that the possibility of diminishing American trading oppor-
tunities supplies a rationalization for creating exceptions, other excep-
tions, not strictly necessary to honoring primary boycott requests,
become logically acceptable. Thus, there is an exception for unilateral
and specific selections of suppliers."4 Suppose an Arab buyer orders a
48. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a) (1979).
49. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b) (1979).
50. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(c) (1979).
51. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d) (1979).
52. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(e) (1979).
53. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f) (1979).
54. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c) (1979).
[Vol. 14:695
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General Motors car because Ford is blacklisted. The prospective
American seller may know to a certainty that the selection is boycott-
motivated. Nevertheless, since the selection was unilateral-the Arab
buyer chose by itself-and specific--G.M. was chosen by name-the
American seller can comply. Why? Because refusal to comply would
drive the Arab buyer elsewhere. Clearly, the exception protects our
own commercial interests. It does more than acknowledge the legiti-
macy of primary boycotts.
From a practical viewpoint, the unilateral and specific selection
exception signifies that the EAR are not easily understood or
remembered. A successful analytical approach may begin with the
premise that primary boycotts are acceptable and secondary and terti-
ary boycotts are not, but it cannot end there.
The six exceptions allow a United States person, notwithstanding
that the thresholds have been crossed, to:
1. Comply with import requirements of the boycotting coun-
try that prohibit the import of goods from the boycotted
country or from its nationals, residents or business con-
cerns; or to comply with shipping requirements prohibit-
ing shipment by carriers of the boycotted country,
prescribing certain shipping routes or proscribing
others.55
2. Furnish certain otherwise prohibited information in re-
sponse to shipping or import document requirements of
the boycotting country. In particular, information can be
supplied regarding (i) the country of origin of the goods,
(ii) the name of the carrier, (iii) the route of the shipment,
(iv) the name of the supplier of the shipment, and (v) the
names of the providers of other services. The permissible
information must generally be couched in positive, non-
blacklisting and non-exclusionary language.56
3. Comply with certain unilateral and specific selections. In
order for the exception to apply, the selection must be
made by a boycotting country (which may include United
States persons). The selection may refer only to (1) carri-
ers, (ii) insurers, (iii) goods identifiable as to source at the
time of importation by virtue of trademarks, uniqueness
of design or appearance or other identification on the
goods or their packaging (but not on documents), or (iv)
55. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1) to .3(a-2) (1979).
56. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) (1979).
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services to be performed in the boycotting country if such
services are customarily and necessarily performed in the
customer's country and the services are not an insignifi-
cant part of the total package of services provided. In no
case, however, may compliance with the selection result
in discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.57
4. Comply with requirements of the boycotting country
prohibiting the export of goods to a boycotted country or
its nationals, residents or companies, whether directly or
by transshipment through other countries.-8
5. If the United States person is an individual, comply with
a boycotting country's visa, passport, immigration or em-
ployment requirements. This means an individual may
furnish information about his own and his family's reli-
gion. The individual's employer may not furnish such in-
formation. 9
6. If the United States person is a bona fide resident of a
boycotting country, comply with local laws regarding its
exclusively local activities or regarding imports of goods
(not services) for its own use (not resale) in the boycotting
country. Under no conditions does the exception allow
discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.6
Each of the exceptions relates to one or more of the prohibitions.
That is, there is no conduct that is or should be permitted by an excep-
tion (or even described by an exception) unless it is prohibited by one
of the prohibitions. Although the exceptions deserve meticulous con-
sideration of their own, it appears to the author more informative to
combine the discussions of the prohibitions and the exceptions. This is
done below.
To preserve this article's limited scope, some of the prohibitions
and exceptions will not be discussed further. In particular, the prohibi-
tions against discriminating on the basis of religion, race, sex, or na-
tional origin, or supplying information on those issues, and the
exception for individual compliance with visa requirements will not be
discussed. Basically, these rules will not often be encountered, but
when they are the analysis can be lengthy. Instead, the following dis-
57. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c) (1979).
58. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(d) (1979).
59. 15 C.F.RL § 369.3(e) (1979).
60. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f) (1979).
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cussion will highlight the types of boycott-related problems the major-
ity of American businesses can expect to confront.
1. Refusals to Do Business-the First Prohibition
The first prohibition takes aim at the direct consequence of the
secondary and tertiary boycotts, refusals by United States persons to do
business with or in the boycotted nation (secondary) or with those who
fail to support the boycott (tertiary).
The term "refusal" is quite a bit broader than one might expect. It
encompasses actual refusals, knowing agreements to refuse, requiring
another person to refuse, and knowingly agreeing to require another
person to refuse. It contemplates active refusal as well as passive but
conscious declination.6" The mere absence of a business relationship is
not, of itself, evidence of a refusal to do business.62 The law imposes no
duty to seek out blacklisted suppliers or boycotted nations and begin
doing business with them. It only prohibits refusals based on boycott
considerations.
Wholesaler, a distributor of brooms, desires to supply brooms to
an Arab buyer. Normally Wholesaler buys its brooms from Broomco,
a blacklisted concern. To secure an order for brooms, Wholesaler de-
cides to offer brooms made by Sweepco, a non-blacklisted firm.
Wholesaler has refused to do business with Broomco.63
Assume that Wholesaler had never dealt with Broomco, but al-
ways with Sweepco. Wholesaler's failure to offer Broomco's brooms
does not imply a refusal to do business.' Nevertheless, if Wholesaler
considers purchasing the brooms from Broomco but declines because
the latter is blacklisted, Wholesaler has refused to do business with
Broomco.
65
Now suppose Wholesaler secures an order to provide Sweepco's
brooms. Payment will be made by letter of credit, issued by the Arab
buyer's bank in favor of Wholesaler. To draw its draft against the let-
ter of credit, Wholesaler must present shipping, insurance, and country
of origin documents, as is typical in international sales. In addition,
though, Wholesaler must certify that the brooms were not made by any
blacklisted firm. If Wholesaler provides the certification it will be con-
61. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(2)-(4) (1979).
62. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(10) (1979).
63. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(6) (1979).
64. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a) ex.(viii) (1979).
65. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(3) (1979).
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cluded that Wholesaler has refused to do business with all blacklisted
firms, including Broomco. More to the point-at least in the context of
the EAR-Wholesaler has also furnished prohibited boycott-based in-
formation. This will be discussed in detail below.66
Wholesaler has a branch office in London, engaged in providing
procurement services to broom purchasers. The London branch is re-
tained by an Arab buyer in desparate need of broom-buying advice.
The Arab buyer requests the London branch to provide a list of quali-
fied broom manufacturers who can supply all of the buyer's require-
ments for a year. The Arab buyer stipulates that no blacklisted
manufacturers are to be recommended. Bristling at this request, the
London branch seeks legal advice from its parent's law firm in
Oklahoma. What is the correct advice?
Is the proposed transaction in the interstate or foreign commerce
of the United States? No, because no United States origin services will
be provided. Although the legal services obtained by the London
branch are in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States,
they are ancillary services, and do not supply the jurisdictional nexus
for the broom-buying advice to be provided the Arab buyer. A neces-
sary jurisdictional threshhold not having been crossed, the prohibitions
are inapplicable.67
Suppose the London branch provides advice it obtains from its
parent. Any advice it gives will have been procured from its United
States parent for the specific purpose of serving the Arab client. The
commerce requirement is now met.6 8 The London branch is clearly a
United States person, because it is a controlled-in-fact foreign branch
of a domestic concern.69 And there is no doubt that the intent require-
ment is met, since the Arab buyer quite specifically excluded "black-
listed" manufacturers.70 Now what advice does the Oklahoma attorney
provide?
"Don't do it!" Pre-award selection services-what the London
branch would be providing--cannot result in the exclusion of black-
listed suppliers. Such exclusion would constitute an impermissible re-
fusal to do business.71
66. See notes 103-31 infra and accompanying text.
67. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(10) (1979).
68. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(9) (1979).
69. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(c)(5) (1979).
70. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e) (1979).
71. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(6) (1979).
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The London branch successfully negotiates the deletion of the re-
quirement from the Arab client's proposed contract, and a contract is
signed. The London branch provides a list of qualified manufacturers
all located in the United States. Then the Arab buyer requests the
London branch to purchase brooms for it, but only from two of the five
manufacturers recommended by the London branch.
If the London branch has reason to know that the other three rec-
ommended manufacturers are excluded because they are blacklisted,
the London branch may not implement the choice.72 That would be a
refusal to do business, and illegal unless an exception is available to
allow the implementation.
The unilateral and specific selection exception may be available.73
Is the Arab buyer's choice unilateral? If the buyer were to designate a
broom manufacturer without assistance of any kind from the London
branch, the answer would surely be yes. In the hypothetical, though,
the buyer is assisted by the London branch's pre-award survey. The
rule is that a pre-award survey does not destroy the unilateral character
of a buyer's selection and is not itself a refusal to do business if the
survey is not boycott-based-that is, no potential candidates are ex-
cluded for reasons related to the boycott-and if the provision of pre-
award surveys is a customary service provided by the seller or the
seller's industry.74 The hypothetical stipulates that the London branch
is engaged in providing such services-thus it is customary for the
seller-and that the survey provided by the London branch is not boy-
cott-based. The selection, therefore, is still unilateral.
Is the choice specific? Probably not; specific means affirmative and
singular.75 If the selection identified only one manufacturer, it would
be specific.
The next question is whether the goods would be, as required by
the unilateral and specific selection exception, identifiable by source at
the time of import. Assuming the brooms carry a trademark or are
packaged in cardboard boxes stamped with the manufacturer's name,
they would be identifiable.76
The final issue in determining the availability of the exception is
whether the Arab buyer is a member of the class of persons whose uni-
72. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a)(7) (1979).
73. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c) (1979).
74. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(6) (1979).
75. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(4) (1979).
76. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(1), .3(c)(17) (1979).
1979]
17
Dubin: A Journey through the Antiboycott Laws
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
lateral and specific selections, assuming the other requirements of the
exception are met, may be honored. As a national of a boycotting na-
tion, the Arab buyer belongs to that class. 77
Thus, assuming only one manufacturer is specified, the unilateral
and specific exception is available. The net effect is that the London
branch may refuse to deal with some blacklisted persons, although such
refusal is generally prohibited. It is imperative that the analysis of is-
sues like those presented by the hypothetical proceeds as illustrated:
first ascertain the satisfaction of the jurisdictional threshholds, then de-
termine whether a prohibition would be violated by the proposed con-
tract, and only then determine if an exception is available.
Returning to Wholesaler, the hypothetical American broom seller,
suppose the Arab buyer stipulates that no brooms supplied shall be
manufactured in Israel, or by Israeli companies, nationals, or residents.
Wholesaler may agree to this demand; this would constitute observance
of the primary boycott, which is allowed by the first exception. 78
Under no circumstances do the EAR attempt to force Israeli goods
down Arab buyer's throats.
A slight variation will illustrate why Wholesaler observed the pri-
mary but not the secondary boycott. Suppose the Arab buyer insists
that Wholesaler cease all its dealings with Israel. This request repre-
sents the classic secondary boycott: "You can't do business with us if
you do business with them." Wholesaler may not agree to the demand,
for it would be a refusal to do business generally with the object of the
boycott, and no exception would be available. The first exception is
limited to particular transactions. It allows compliance only with those
import requirements of the boycotting country prohibiting the import
of goods or services from the boycotted country, or from companies,
nationals, or residents of the boycotted country.79
Requests for refusals to do business are not confined to manufac-
turers or suppliers of goods. Wholesaler may not, for example, refuse
to engage an architect because he is blacklisted, refuse to insure a ship-
ment of goods with blacklisted insurers, or refuse to ship goods on
blacklisted carriers.
The first exception also allows compliance with certain shipping
77. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(1) (1979).
78. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1) (1) (1979).
79. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1)(2) (1979).
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requirements of the boycotting country.8" Wholesaler may refuse to
ship goods on a ship registered in Israel or owned or operated by Israeli
nationals or residents.81 Further, Wholesaler may agree to routing in-
structions imposed by the boycotting countries. 2 Typically Arab buy-
ers will require that the ship be non-Israeli and that it does not stop in
Israel en route to its destination in the Arab country. The EAR actu-
ally treat these requests as wholly unrelated to the boycott. They are
characterized, instead, as precautions against the risk of confiscation of
the goods by the Arab buyers' enemies.83
The prohibition against refusals to deal is also limited by two other
exceptions, the export and transshipment84 and local law85 exceptions.
Briefly, it is a refusal to do business if a United States person refuses to
export goods from an Arab country to Israel, or to any blacklisted per-
sons. The refusal to export to Israel is permitted by the export excep-
tion, because the refusal to export Arab goods to Israel is an incident of
the primary boycott. The refusal to export to blacklisted persons, being
an incident of the tertiary boycott, is impermissible.
The local law exception is extremely complex and of limited use-
fulness. If a United States person is a bona fide resident86 of a boycott-
ing country, it may comply with local boycott laws but only with
respect to its activities exclusively within the boycotting country, and
may comply with boycott-based restrictions on the import of goods-
not services-imported for its own use in the boycotting country.
Goods are for the United States person's own use if they are consumed
by the person, used by the person to perform services for others, further
manufactured or incorporated into other products to be resold by the
person, or permanently affixed to a project the person is constructing if
affixation is customary in similar situations.87 Finally, the source of
goods must be identifiable at the time of import, either by trademark,
uniqueness of design, or distinctiveness in packaging. If goods meet
this test, they are "specifically identifiable, ' 8  and the test is the same
for the purposes of the unilateral and specific selection exception as
80. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-2) (1979).
81. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-2)(1)(i), (3) (1979).
82. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-2)(1)(ii) (1979).
83. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) ex.(ix) (1979).
84. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(d) (1979).
85. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f) (1979).
86. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f)(2) (1979).
87. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(6) (1979).
88. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(17) (1979).
1979]
19
Dubin: A Journey through the Antiboycott Laws
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
well as the local law exception. 9
Whether a United States person is a bona fide resident of a boy-
cotting country is a question of fact. The EAR set forth some factors to
consider, including physical presence, continuity of and intent to con-
tinue the physical presence, prior residence, legitimacy of the presence
for business reasons, registration to do business in the country, and
existence of presence in other countries under similar circumstances. 90
It is important not only to the local law exception but also to the excep-
tion for unilateral and specific selections. The class of persons whose
selections may be observed comprises the boycotting country, nationals
of the boycotting country, and residents of the boycotting country.91 A
United States person is a resident only if it is a bona fide resident. 92
Here is an example of the interplay among the prohibition against
refusals to deal, the unilateral and specific selection exception, and the
local law exception. Assume Contractor is a United States person
building an airport complex in Egypt. Contractor is, by assumption, a
bona fide resident of Egypt. Wholesaler is a supplier of steel products,
based in Oklahoma and, for simplicity, unrelated to Contractor.
Wholesaler normally obtains I-beams and sinks for Contractor from
Steelco, an Illinois manufacturer, when Contractor constructs airport
complexes. But, because Steelco is blacklisted, Contractor cannot im-
port its sinks or I-beams into Egypt. Contractor requests Wholesaler to
obtain sinks and I-beams from Stainless, a non-blacklisted manufac-
turer in New York. Also for boycott reasons, Contractor requests
Wholesaler to ship the sinks and I-beams with Shipper, a non-black-
listed carrier, although Wholesaler normally ships to Contractor via
Boater, a blacklisted carrier. How do the EAR treat Contractor and
Wholesaler?
First, the jurisdictional elements must be considered. Contractor
and Wholesaler are both United States persons.9 Contractor is order-
ing goods from the United States to fill a specific order, and Wholesaler
is shipping goods from the United States, so the commerce requirement
is met for both.94 Contractor certainly fulfills the intent requirement
and, assuming Wholesaler has reason to know Stainless and Shipper
89. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.3(c)(16), .3(f-2)(4) (1979).
90. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.3(f)(3) (1979).
91. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(1) (1979).
92. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(t)(2) (1979).
93. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b) (1979).
94. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d) (1979).
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were chosen because Steelco and Boater are blacklisted, Wholesaler
also fulfills the intent requirement.
95
Next, is a prohibition violated? Yes. Both Contractor and Whole-
saler are refusing to do business with Steelco and Boater, because they
are blacklisted persons.96
Finally, is there an applicable exception? Contractor wants to take
advantage of the local law exception. Contractor is a bona fide resident
of a boycotting country, as stated. The specification of Stainless con-
cerns goods, and the goods are for Contractor's own use in the boycott-
ing country, because they will be permanently affixed to a project
Contractor is constructing.97 The I-beams, however, are probably not
specifically identifiable. The sinks may be-perhaps they are trade-
marked-and it is assumed here that they are. The local law exception
is therefore unavailable for Contractor's selection of Stainless' I-beams
but is available for the selection of its sinks.98
The specification of Shipper concerns carriage, a service. Since the
local law exception only applies to selections of goods, Contractor's se-
lection is not covered. 99 Thus, Contractor's selection of Shipper vio-
lates the prohibition against refusals to deal.
Wholesaler wants to avail itself of the unilateral and specific selec-
tion exception. The selections it receives from Contractor come from a
resident of the boycotting country, Contractor, which is only a resident
because it is a bona fide resident."° The selection of Stainless concerns
goods and the selection of Shipper concerns carriers, so the subject
matter of the selections is eligible for the exception. 101 The I-beams are
not specifically identifiable by source at the time of import into Egypt;
the sinks are. Finally, both selections are unilateral-made by Con-
tractor by itself-and specific-affirmative and singular. Thus, the uni-
lateral and specific selection exception is only available to Wholesaler
for the selection of Stainless' sinks and of Shipper as a carrier. 02
To conform the hypothetical to a typical situation, assume that
Contractor and Wholesaler are both wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Conglomerate, an Oklahoma corporation. Counsel for Conglomerate
95. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e) (1979).
96. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(a) (1979).
97. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(6)(v) (1979).
98. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2) (1979).
99. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f-2)(8) (1979).
100. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(f(2) (1979).
101. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(1) (1979).
102. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(c)(1) (1979).
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is faced with this conclusion: Contractor may not select I-beams from
Stainless and Wholesaler could not comply with the selection; Contrac-
tor may select Stainless' sinks and Wholesaler may comply with the
selection; and Contractor may not select Shipper but Wholesaler could
comply with the selection.
Clearly these facts pose traps for the unwary! Even more para-
doxes are in store. Now consider the next major prohibition-the pro-
hibition against supplying boycott-based information.
2. Furnishing Boycott Based Information-the Fourth
Prohibition
The fourth prohibition takes aim at one of the most effective tools
employed by the Arab nations to strengthen the boycott of Israel. The
accumulation of information is essential to the success of the boycott.
In order to engage in the secondary boycott, the Arab nations must
identify those companies that trade with or in Israel. Otherwise they
would not know whom to blacklist. Similarly, the tertiary boycott can
succeed only if companies selling to the Arabs confirm that they have
not dealt with blacklisted companies.
The accumulation of the necessary data is a monumental task, and
the Arab nations have information networks inadequate to compile it.
If the network is expanded, though, to include all of the Arab nations'
commercial suitors, the task suddenly becomes manageable. This is
what the Arab nations have done, and what the fourth prohibition at-
tempts to undo.
The general prohibition as set forth in the EAR, without para-
graph numbering, follows:
No United States person may furnish or knowingly agree to
furnish information concerning his or any other person's past,
present or proposed business relationships: . . . with or in a
boycotted country;. . . with any business concern organized
under the laws of a boycotting country;. . . with any national
or resident of a boycotting country; or . . . with any other
person who is known or believed to be restricted from having
any business relationship with or in a boycotting country.10 3
The regulation continues with an expansive list of what business rela-
tionships are, an admonition that the prohibition applies whether or
not the information is requested or supplied without request, and the
103. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(1) (1979).
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important qualification that normal business information may never-
theless be supplied in a commercial context.
Before considering the vagaries of the prohibition, a few general
rules may be stated.
The phrase "business relationships" is intended to be broad. It
contemplates all profit-oriented relationships, presumably unprofitable
as well as profitable, including relationships of sale, purchase, supply,
legal or commercial representation, shipping or other transportation,
insurance, investment, or any other imaginable type.'"
No information may be supplied in response to an inquiry from a
boycott office. All inquiries from boycott offices are deemed to be boy-
cott-based and never to arise in a commercial context. 10 5 For that mat-
ter, any inquiry that explicitly reveals a boycott-related purpose should
never be answered.
Neither the presence nor the absence of a business relationship
may be discussed. It is quite clearly a violation-assuming the satisfac-
tion of the jurisdictional tests-for a United States person, in answer to
any question about its business relationships in Israel, to respond that it
has none. 106
The requirement that the person about whom information is fur-
nished be a person known or believed to be restricted from having busi-
ness relationships with the boycotting country" 7 is extremely diluted.
In fact and in practice, the requirement is nonexistent. The EAR pro-
vide the example of a United States company asked to certify that its
supplier is not on the boycotting country's blacklist. The example con-
cludes that the United States company may not respond, because it
would be furnishing information about a person believed to be re-
stricted from having business relationships with the boycotting coun-
try. 108
This is an odd answer. Suppose the supplier is not blacklisted, and
the United States company knows it. If the United States company
responded, it would be providing information about a person known
not to be restricted. Nevertheless, the United States company may not
respond.
Obviously, the intent of the EAA and the EAR cannot support a
104. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(2)(i) (1979).
105. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(4) (1979).
106. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d) ex.(i) (1979).
107. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(1)(iv) (1979).
108. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d) ex.(x) (1979).
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construction of the literal language that would allow responses only if
the person about whom the information is furnished is not blacklisted,
for that distinction would itself furnish all the information the Arab
inquirers need.
In practice, consequently, any requirement that the person about
whom information is furnished be known or believed to be restricted
from dealing with the boycotting country should be ignored. The rule
may be rewritten as a simple imperative: do not furnish information
about business relationships with anyone if the purpose of doing so is
boycott-related.
Normal business information may be furnished in a commercial
context.109 The obvious example is the company that wants to peddle
its wares in untapped territory. Normally it sends its brochure, perhaps
an annual report, to prospective customers. A potential buyer evaluat-
ing competing suppliers may request an annual report. Even though
the report discloses that the hopeful seller has no business in Israel, the
report would be normal business information in a commercial con-
text.110 If, therefore, an Arab buyer asks for such a report, the request
may normally be honored. Only if the hopeful seller-to whom all of
this will matter only if it is a United States person acting in the inter-
state or foreign commerce of the United States-has reason to believe
the information is requested for boycott-based purposes is the seller
prohibited from responding. 1
Normal business information may be much more specific than the
annual report. Suppose three United States corporations are the com-
peting finalists for a construction job in Jordan. Each is requested to
provide a list of all similar jobs previously performed. Presumably the
lists will allow the Jordanian buyer to evaluate the contractors' techni-
cal competence; therefore, the lists may be provided. If, however, any
of the corporations has reason to know the lists are requested to ascer-
tain whether it has performed construction jobs in Israel, it may not
supply its list.
One nagging interpretive problem with the fourth prohibition in-
volves the "self-certification" controversy. In an interpretation ap-
pended to the EAR several months after their initial issuance, the
Commerce Department announced that it is permissible for a United
109. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(3) (1979).
110. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d) ex.(ii) (1979).
111. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.2(d)(4), .2(d) ex.(ifi) (1979).
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States person to certify that it is not blacklisted. 1 2
The self-certification issue was so controversial that, in initially is-
suing the EAR, the Commerce Department dealf with it only obliquely,
and in a completely different prohibition. The prohibition against im-
plementing letters of credit-the sixth prohibition-forbids any United
States person to implement a letter of credit containing a condition
with which the beneficiary of the credit may not legally comply.1 13 In
the notorious example (xiv) I 4 under that section, a United States bank
confirmed a letter of credit requiring the United States beneficiary to
certify that it was not blacklisted. The example concluded that, while
the bank could not insist that the beneficiary certify, the bank could
implement the credit. The bank could not insist because it would be
violating the prohibition against refusals to do business, not the letter
of credit prohibition. The self-certification issue was wholly ignored in
the examples under the prohibition against furnishing information.
The subsequent interpretation finally attacked the question frontally.
Or did it?
In the interpretation, the Commerce Department set forth its view
(why it did not amend the EAR is unclear, especially in view of the
inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to the rulemaking
process1 s) that a shipper or insurer may certify that it is "eligible" to
do business in the boycotting country. No other person, though, could
provide this information about the shipper or insurer. Only self-certifi-
cation is permitted. The Commerce Department finessed the underly-
ing legal issues and cited as sole authority for its interpretation example
(xiv) under the letter of credit prohibition. Disingenuously, the Com-
merce Department noted that furnishing the information offends no
prohibition.
Some conjecture about the real reason for this viewpoint seems in
order. Many United States companies that deal or have dealt with
Israel remain eligible-not blacklisted-to do business with the Arabs.
This occurs because the Arabs need the goods these companies sell or
because the Arabs are unaware of the companies' business relation-
ships. If one of these companies certifies that it is not blacklisted, is it
furnishing information? The Commerce Department apparently thinks
112. 15 C.F.R. § 369 Appendix (1979).
113. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(1) (1979).
114. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f) ex.(xiv) (1979).
115. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2407 (Supp. 1979) (reinacted Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 13(a), 93 Stat 503 (1979)).
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not: the blacklist is too unreliable an index of companies that do busi-
ness with Israel. The case for the Commerce Department's interpreta-
tion is even stronger if a company certifies to its eligibility. "Why", the
average businessman might wonder, ignorant of the boycott ramifica-
tions, "would I be ineligible?" As a matter of policy, the Department
thinks the certifications should be permitted.
Why then, cannot one businessman say another is eligible or not
blacklisted? Again, as a policy matter, the Commerce Department
thinks that certification should be prohibited, perhaps because the mere
undertaking to provide information about another should alert the pro-
vider to the boycott overtones of the information.
By no means does the Commerce Department believe its interpre-
tation immutably accurate. Anyone asked to supply a self-certification
should be cautious for several reasons. First, the Department may
change its viewpoint-this is suggested by the use of an interpretation
rather than of an amended regulation. Second, rarely is a company
asked to certify only to its own status. It is asked about its parents,
subsidiaries, and other affiliates, and no information may be furnished
about their status.11 6 Third, and the most persuasive reason, the Treas-
ury Department rejects the Commerce Department viewpoint. Provid-
ing a self-certification may result in the forfeiture of tax benefits under
the Treasury uidelines.1 7
An important exception to the prohibition against furnishing in-
formation is the exception for import and shipping document require-
ments, the second exception.' 1 8
Under the second exception a United States person may comply or
agree to comply with certain import and shipping document require-
ments of a boycotting country. The following information may be sup-
plied, but only in positive, non-blacklisting and non-exclusionary
terms: country of origin of goods, names of suppliers, and the names of
other service providers. Negative language may be used to supply the
name of a carrier of a shipment and to describe a shipping route, but
only to provide information to comply with precautionary require-
ments protecting against war risks or risks of confiscation." 9
Here is a simple illustration of the second exception, and the con-
116. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d) ex.(xviii) (1979).
117. This will result if the certification is provided in response to a letter of credit requirement.
See note 194 infra and accompanying text.
118. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) (1979).
119. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.3(b)(1)-.3(b)(2) (1979).
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fusion it has borne. Distributor is a New York trader that receives a
tender from Iraq, soliciting bids to provide a quantity of shoes. The
tender sets forth all the terms of the resulting sales contract, one of
which requires that no Israeli goods be supplied. Distributor bids and
is awarded the contract.
So far, Distributor has not violated the EAR. It is a refusal to do
business with Israel for Distributor to agree to the boycott term, but
Distributor is insulated by the exception for import requirements of a
boycotting country.
The Iraqi buyer's bank issues a letter of credit in favor of Distribu-
tor. The letter of credit requires Distributor to provide certifications
that the carrier is not blacklisted, that the carrier does not fly the flag of
Israel, that the carrier does not stop in Israel en route to Iraq, that the
shoes are of United States origin, that the manufacturer of the shoes is
not blacklisted, and that the shoes are of non-Israeli origin. How may
Distributor respond?
Assuming Distributor is the manufacturer, it may certify that it,
the manufacturer, is not blacklisted.120 As the Commerce Department
says, this offends no prohibition.
Distributor may not certify that the carrier is not blacklisted. The
exception would not apply because the certification does not protect
against war risks or risks of confiscation. 121
Distributor may certify that the carrier does not fly the flag of
Israel and that it will not stop in Israel en route to Iraq.122 These are
war or confiscation risk certifications. Distributor must be sure to dis-
tinguish between stopping in Israel before and after the carrier has ar-
rived in Iraq. Since there is no risk that Israel could confiscate the
goods after unloading in Iraq, the risk certification must refer to the
period when the risk exists.
Distributor may certify that the goods are of United States origin
but not that they are non-Israeli.' 23 Only positive, non-blacklisting,
and non-exclusionary language may be used. Thus, Distributor may
agree to sell "non-Israeli" goods, 24 but it may not later certify that the
goods are "non-Israeli."
If Distributor had tax benefits it was willing to forfeit, it could
120. 15 C.F.R. § 369 app. (1979).
121. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) ex.(vi) (1979).
122. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) ex.(vii), (ix) (1979).
123. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) ex.(tii) (1979).
124. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a-1) ex.(ii) (1979).
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fulfill some of the letter of credit conditions somewhat indirectly. Dis-
tributor may not certify that the carrier is not blacklisted, but the car-
rier may. Distributor could request the carrier to provide the self-
certification and forward it for presentment to the paying bank. 25 In
no event, however, could Distributor insist that the carrier comply; that
would be a refusal by Distributor to do business with the carrier.126 If
Distributor followed this route, it would constitute "participation in or
cooperation with" an international boycott under the Guidelines, and
could expose Distributor to forfeiture of tax benefits.1 27
One of the conditions of the second exception is that the allowable
information-in the appropriate form-may be furnished only in re-
sponse to import and shipping document requirements imposed by the
boycotting country. Since documentary letters of credit usually call for
presentment of import and shipping documents, letter of credit require-
ments generally suffice for the purposes of the exception. 2 Laws, reg-
ulations, and ordinances certainly are "requirements." Customs and
usages of trade may be, if so common as practically to have the force of
law. The point is that whether a request stems from a requirement of
the boycotting country or from the personal prejudice of a xenophobic
customs inspector is an issue that should not be neglected.
The final major issue arising under the prohibition against furnish-
ing boycott information relates to one of the jurisdictional thresholds,
the commerce requirement. The interpretive hurdle is easy to spot but
difficult to resolve. If a French subsidiary of a United States corpora-
tion receives a general boycott questionnaire from Syria, would an-
swering constitute an activity in the interstate or foreign commerce of
the United States?
Generally, the EAR are applied transactionally. If the question-
naire relates to no specific transaction, the commerce requirement may
not be met. However, the French subsidiary may require information
from its United States parent in order to answer the questions. If it
obtains the information from its United States parent specifically to an-
swer the questionnaire, the commerce requirement is probably satis-
fied.' 29 If it has received the information previously, for reasons
125. 15 C.F.R. § 369 app. (1979).
126. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f) ex.(xiv) (1979).
127. See note 194 infra and accompanying text.
128. 15 C.F.R. § 369.3(b) ex.(xiii) (1979).
129. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(9) (1979).
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unrelated to the questionnaire, the commerce requirement is probably
not satisfied.
The answer is not, however, all that certain. The problem is that
the section of the EAR concerning the subsequent disposal of services
acquired from a person located in the United States refers only to serv-
ices, not information. 3 ' In other sections the EAR refer to "services
(including information)."'' The Commerce Department has not indi-
cated whether the omission of the parenthetical was an oversight or a
conscious attempt to dissuade responses to boycott questionnaires.
3. Implementing Letters of Credit-the Sixth Prohibition
If a letter of credit contains a condition with which the beneficiary
may not comply, no United States person may implement the letter of
credit.' 32 This is true, of course, only if the jurisdictional tests are satis-
fied.
"Implementing" includes nearly all actions that may be taken with
respect to a letter of credit except advising it and transmitting it. It
specifically includes, under the EAR, issuing, opening, honoring, ac-
cepting, paying, confirming, negotiating, and, just to be sure, any other
action taken to implement a letter of credit. 133
Because United States persons that are banks are so hamstrung by
the prohibition, compliance with the EAR provides an absolute defense
to actions to enforce letters of credit. The defense applies only if the
defendant complies with the EAR and is thereby precluded from im-
plementing the letter of credit. 134
For banks located in the United States, the intent requirement will
frequently present interpretive problems. Basically, banks are in the
business of buying and selling credit and money. They do not trade in
any other commodities. Banks are properly unaware of many or most
of the underlying contractual arrangements of many deals the banks
finance. When a bank confirms a letter of credit and later accepts or
pays drafts drawn under the letter of credit, the bank is interested only
in the conformity with the conditions of the letter of credit of all docu-
ments presented.
Because conformity of documents-not their accuracy or genuine-
130. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(13) (1979).
131. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)(11) (1979).
132. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(1) (1979).
133. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(2) (1979).
134. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f)(5) (1979).
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ness-is the banks' principal concern, banks are able to provide letter
of credit services rather economically. The whole process from issu-
ance through final payment can be handled simply and efficiently by
clerks.
It is not hard to imagine the banker's nightmare about the EAR
(and the Guidelines): how can clerks be trained to notice and evaluate
the significance of every term in a letter of credit? If a clerk overlooks a
prohibited certification requirement, has the bank violated the EAR?
The Commerce Department's realistic construction of the intent
requirement provides some solace to the banker. If a bank implements
suitable systems to monitor letters of credit and to detect boycott-re-
lated clauses, the bank has properly discharged its duties. Failure to
catch an individual prohibited certification will then be treated as a
mistake, and the intent requirement will remain unsatisfied.1 3 -
If a bank is aware that an underlying contract does contain pro-
hibited conditions, the bank may not implement the letter of credit,
even if the letter of credit omits the prohibited conditions.1 36 However,
this will not be the usual situation, and banks have no duty to inquire
about underlying arrangements.
Two jurisdictional tests apply to the analysis of letter of credit
transactions. The prohibition applies only if the implementation of the
letter of credit meets the commerce test and only if the beneficiary may
not comply with a condition of the letter of credit. Whether the benefi-
ciary may comply depends on whether the underlying transaction
meets the jurisdictional tests. Thus, while implementation of a letter of
credit by a bank located in the United States will always be a transac-
tion in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States, such a
bank must determine whether the underlying transaction meets the ju-
risdictional tests. The EAR provide a few rebuttable presumptions.
For banks located within the United States, the beneficiary will be
presumed to be a United States person if the beneficiary has a United
States address as specified by the letter of credit. Otherwise, the benefi-
ciary will be presumed not to be a United States person. 137
For banks located outside the United States, the underlying trans-
action will be presumed to meet the commerce test and the beneficiary
presumed a United States person if the credit specifies a United States
135. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e) (1979).
136. Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(t) ex.(xvi) (1979).
137. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.2(f)(7)-.2(f)(8) (1979).
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address for the beneficiary and calls for documents indicating shipment
from the United States or shipment of United States origin goods. If
either element is missing-the United States address suggesting the
beneficiary is a United States person or the United States origin ship-
ment suggesting the underlying transaction satisfies the commerce
test-the underlying transaction will be presumed not to satisfy the ju-
risdictional thresholds. 138
The earlier discussion of example (xiv)139 under the letter of credit
section now deserves further attention. As stated above, the example
supposes the satisfaction of the jurisdictional tests and the presence of a
self-certification requirement in a letter of credit. A beneficiary may
refuse to provide such a certificate for any number of reasons, includ-
ing its realistic desire to preserve lucrative tax benefits. The bank may
not insist that the beneficiary provide the certification. That is as far as
the example goes.
Unfortunately, the example ignores the most practical question of
all: must the bank pay? If the bank pays, it violates its contract with its
customer, the opener of the credit, by accepting inadequate documenta-
tion. The EAR provide the bank no defense to improper payment, just
refusals to pay. If the bank refuses to pay, is it "insisting" on the self-
certification? If so, it will have violated the first prohibition, but that is
no help to the beneficiary, for the EAA provides no civil remedies. The
bank is in a relentless predicament, and the beneficiary is not better
situated. The beneficiary can not sue successfully, because it has not
fulfilled the conditions of the credit. Since the beneficiary is allowed by
the EAR to provide the self-certification, the beneficiary can not claim
legal inability to comply.
Until this maze is unraveled, there is a simple solution for Ameri-
can sellers: do not accept a letter of credit with a self-certification re-
quirement, unless the forfeiture of tax benefits is also acceptable. In
many cases, the self-certification provisions can be successfully deleted
after negotiations with the Arab customers.
D. Evasion
The EAR apply to any action taken by a United States person with
intent to evade their provisions."4 Any such action, or any assistance
138. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.2(f)(9)-.2(f)(10) (1979).
139. Prohibition Against Implementing Letters of Credit, 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(f) ex.(xiv) (1979).
140. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(a) (1979).
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provided by one United States person to another to violate or evade the
EAR, is itself a violation of the EAR.
Evasion or intent to evade is necessarily difficult to describe com-
prehensively. A few general rules are provided, and they are discussed
here.
First, repeatedly taking advantage of the exceptions to the prohibi-
tions does not constitute evasion. 141 Thus, a United States person sell-
ing goods or services in Egypt may always refuse to sell Israeli goods or
services in Egypt.
Second, use of any "artifice, device or scheme which is intended to
place a person at a commercial disadvantage or impose on him special
burdens because he is blacklisted. . . will be regarded as evasion."1 42
Third, rearrangement of the structure of a United States person's
business relationships with or in Arab countries or Israel will not con-
stitute evasion if undertaken for legitimate business reasons and not
solely to avoid the EAR. 143
One artifice, scheme, or device envisaged by the EAR is the now
famous "Aramco clause." Before the effective date of the EAR,
Aramco introduced into its procurement contracts a clause providing
that its suppliers retained the risk of loss until the goods had arrived in
the boycotting country and had cleared customs. Thus, while Aramco
would not refuse to purchase goods from blacklisted companies, black-
listed companies would hesitate to sell to Aramco.
Under the anti-evasion section, the introduction of an Aramco or
"risk of loss" clause after the effective date, January 18, 1978, will be
presumed to be evasion. The presumption may be overcome by a dem-
onstration that the clause is applied evenhandedly and customarily,
without distinction between boycotting and non-boycotting countries,
or that the clause has been in use since before the effective date.'"
Perhaps the most common form of evasion is the shifting of busi-
ness to foreign subsidiaries. If a French subsidiary of an American cor-
poration manufactures its products solely with French origin goods and
sells them without performance guarantees supplied by the parent,
most of its transactions will not satisfy the commerce test. But if the
United States parent directs business inquiries to the subsidiary to
141. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(b) (1979).
142. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(c) (1979).
143. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e) (1979).
144. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(d) (1979).
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avoid the prohibitions of the EAR, the parent will have violated the
EAR. 145
E. Reporting Requirements
All United States persons must report the receipt of any requests
"to take any action which has the effect of furthering or supporting a
restrictive trade practice or boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign
country against a country friendly to the United States or against any
United States person," provided the commerce requirement is satis-
fied. 146 The reporting requirements are comprehensive, though not ter-
ribly complicated.
The issues that arise in applying the reporting requirements are
discussed below. They include: (i) what is a reportable request, (ii)
from whom may a reportable request be received, (iiW) when is a report-
able request received, (iv) what requests are not reportable, (v) how
and when are reportable requests reported, and (vi) what information is
exempt from public disclosure.
1. What Is a Reportable Request?
a. Request Defned
A "request" is very broadly defined and is intended to cover any
communication that asks, suggests, or directs a person to take any ac-
tion which has the effect of furthering or supporting a boycott. A re-
quest may be oral or written. It may be a solicitation, directive, legend,
or instruction. 47 General information that describes import require-
ments of a boycotting country does not constitute a request.148 For ex-
ample, an American exporter may obtain publications discussing trade
with the boycotting countries, which may reveal that imported goods
must be certified to be "non-Israeli." The exporter has not received a
request. 
149
An action taken in anticipation of the receipt of a request may not
constitute a request.5 0 If, for example, a United States exporter inten-
145. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(e) (1979).
146. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(1) (1979).
147. Id.
148. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(4) (1979).
149. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.6(a)(4), .6 ex.(xii) (1979).
150. Preamble to 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 (1978). But, information given to forestall the receipt of a
request that the United States person knows it will receive is equivalent to the receipt of a request
and is therefore reportable as such.
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tionally purchases non-Israeli goods to sell to Egyptian buyers, without
having been requested to do so, the exporter has received no reportable
request.
b. Exceptions Irrelevant
Because the reporting program endeavors to keep the Commerce
Department well-informed on international boycott activity, it is irrele-
vant that a request may be covered by one of the exceptions to the
prohibitions. 15 1 For example, a request to a United States person to
refuse to import Israeli goods into Egypt is reportable, because it would
have the effect of furthering a boycott, despite the fact that the United
States person could agree to the request.
c. Effect of the Request
Whether the effect of any particular request would be to further or
support an unsanctioned boycott is a question of fact, but not usually a
difficult one. In some instances, however, United States persons receiv-
ing requests must read between the lines to determine the potential ef-
fect.
Suppose Seller, an Oklahoma corporation engaged in the world-
wide marketing of tractors, receives a purchase order from a Syrian
buyer for ten Farmco tractors. If Seller knows or has reason to know
Farmco is chosen because it is not blacklisted, Seller has received a
reportable request. 152 Seller may probably comply with the buyer's
unilateral and specific selection, but it must report the request to the
Commerce Department.
d The Commerce Requirement
If a request is received in connection with a particular transaction,
the request is reportable if the transaction is in the interstate or foreign
commerce of the United States.1 53
Some requests, however, relate to no particular transactions. A
general boycott questionnaire may be dispatched to all companies sell-
ing certain goods, so that the central boycott office can compile a list of
eligible companies for later use. The rule is that such a request is re-
portable if the recipient has or anticipates having any business relation-
151. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(1) (1979).
152. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.6(a)(2), .6 ex.(il) (1979).
153. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(2) (1979).
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ship in a boycotting country that would satisfy the commerce
threshold. 15 4 While the term "anticipates" is not defined, it should be
interpreted as including "hopes for," no matter how dim the pros-
pects. 5 5
Inexplicably, the Commerce Department does not specify that the
country in which the United States person has or anticipates having a
business relationship must be the same country from which the request
originates. It appears, however, that a request received from Egypt
must be reported only if the United States person has or anticipates
having business in Egypt.156
2. From Whom Received?
The easy answer is anyone. A U.S. corporation may instruct its
U.S. freight forwarder to compile all documents required by the rele-
vant letter of credit. If one of the required documents is a certificate of
non-Israeli origin, the corporation has made a request-and violated
the prohibition against furnishing information-and the freight for-
warder has received a reportable request. 157
3. When Received?
Generally, a request is received when it is actually received, but
there are a few special rules.
If, during pre-contract negotiations, a United States person re-
ceives a reportable request, it is deemed received at the end of the nego-
tiations. The negotiations may terminate, or conclude successfully, but
in neither event is the reporting requirement triggered until the negoti-
ations have ended. The reporting program does not interrupt negotia-
tions.' 58
In the example of the freight forwarder given above, the freight
forwarder has received the request when it has compiled the requested
documentation, even if it provides a positive certificate of U.S. ori-
gin.15 9
154. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(2)(iii) (1979).
155, 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 ex.(x) (1979).
156. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 ex.(viii) (1979).
157. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 ex.(xiii) (1979).
158. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 ex.(xxvi), (xxvii) (1979).
159. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6 ex.(xiii), (xv) (1979).
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4. Some Non-Reportable Requests
For purposes of administrative convenience, the Commerce De-
partment has waived the reporting requirements for the following re-
quests: (i) requests to provide war or confiscation risk certification, (ii)
requests for positive certifications of origin, (iii) requests for positive
identification of the names of suppliers, manufacturers, or other serv-
ice-providers, (iv) requests to comply with the laws of a boycotting
country that do not expressly refer to the country's boycott laws, (v)
requests for affirmative certification of the destination of exports, and
(vi) requests to an individual to supply information about himself or
his family for immigration, passport, visa, or employment purposes. 60
5. How and When to Report?
Reportable requests are reported to the Commerce Department on
forms it provides. Two forms are available, one to report individual
requests and one for multiple requests. The reporting person can use
whichever form it finds more convenient.1 6
1
Often a request is repeated several times during the course of a
particular transaction. In a sale of goods delivered in installments, for
example, the seller may draw several drafts against a letter of credit,
each draft to be accompanied, according to the credit, by the same neg-
ative certificate of origin. Or a request for an agreement to sell no
goods of Israeli origin may appear in a tender and again in a related
letter of credit. The rule is that each separate request must be reported,
but only once, the first time it is received.' 62
Copies of the relevant pages of the documents containing reporta-
ble requests must accompany the reports. 63 If a request is received
orally, the recipient should prepare a transcript and file it with the re-
port.1' 4
Before June 30, 1979, the reporting forms had to be filed by the
end of the month following the month in which the request is received.
If, however, the reporting person is located outside the United States,
the form had to be filed by the end of the second month following the
160. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(a)(5) (1979).
161. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(b)(5) (1979).
162. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(b)(1) (1979).
163. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(b)(7) (1979).
164. Form ITA-621P (Rev. 8-78), Item 8. This is the form used to report single boycott re-
quests to the Commerce Department. See 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(b)(5)(1979).
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month of receipt. 165
For requests received after June 30, 1979, reports will be filed
quarterly. Persons located in the United States must file by the end of
the first month following the quarter of receipt. Persons located outside
the United States have until the end of the second month following the
quarter of receipt. 166
Reports filed by mail are deemed filed with the Commerce De-
partment according to postmark. As long as the report is postmarked
by the last day of the month, the report is considered punctually
filed. 67
Although every United States person is legally required to report
on its own behalf, it is permissible to designate another person to file
the reports. The designation does not, however, relieve the recipient of
a request of its own filing obligations. Typically, a foreign subsidiary
may appoint its United States parent to report on its behalf, or an
United States exporter may designate its freight forwarder or bank to
report on its behalf. Still, each recipient of a reportable request must
report or have a report filed for that request. 168
6. Public Disclosure
Except for certain proprietary information that may be withheld,
the reports and corresponding documentation filed with the Commerce
Department are freely available for public inspection.
The proprietary information that may be withheld is data relating
only to quantity, description or value of any articles, materials, sup-
plies, and technical data or other information. 169 In order to preserve
confidentiality, additional copies of documents should be cleansed of
this proprietary information, conspicuously labelled "Public Inspection
Copy," and filed with the report to Commerce. 70
The Commerce Department will release no proprietary data unless
it determines either that disclosure would not place the reporting per-
son at a competitive disadvantage or that withholding the data would
be contrary to the national interest.' 7'
165. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(b)(4) (1979).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.6(b)(2)-.6(b)(3) (1979).
169. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(c)(1) (1979).
170. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(c)(2) (1979).
171. 15 C.F.R. § 369.6(c)(1) (1979).
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In the event the Commerce Department is requested to release
proprietary data, it will provide to the reporting person advance notice
and opportunity to comment.172
No proprietary data other than quantity, description, or value may
be kept confidential. Reports filed with excessively cleansed documents
will be rejected by the Commerce Department.
F Penalties
The Commerce Department has at its disposal a powerful arsenal
to penalize violations of the EAR.
Criminal penalties, for knowing or intentional violations, are se-
vere. Criminal offenses merit a fine of $50,000 or three times the value
of the goods or services involved, whichever is greater, or five years in
jail, or both. 173
Civil penalties may be equally severe. A fine of $10,000 may be
assessed for each violation, 174 and it is possible that the fine for delin-
quent reporting may be assessed daily.
The Commerce Department also has authority to seize goods that
are being exported from the United States in transactions that violate
the EAR. Seized goods may be forfeited to the United States or, at the
Department's sole discretion, remitted to the violator. 7'
The most devastating civil penalty is the suspension or revocation
of export privileges.176 Under the Export Administration Act, an ex-
port license is required to export anything from the United States.
(Such licenses are usually automatic, requiring no Commerce Depart-
ment approval.) Further, goods or information exported from the
United States may be restricted from re-export. For example, a prod-
uct sent to Germany may be prohibited from re-export to South Africa.
If the German recipient re-exports in violation of this condition, it will
be penalized by the Commerce Department. It will be ineligible to par-
ticipate in any manner in any transaction subject to United States ex-
172. Id.
173. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2405(a) (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 11(a), 93 Stat. 503 (1979)). Before October 1, 1979, first offenders could
receive a lighter penalty of a $25,000 fine or one year in jail, or both. Id.
174. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2405(c)(1) (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 1 l(c)(1), 93 Stat. 503 (1979)).
175. 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976), made applicable by 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(4) (1979).
176. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2405(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 1 1(c)(2)(A), 93 Stat. 503 (1979)).
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port laws, for the duration of the suspension period, or permanently. 177
As a practical matter, United States persons cannot escape the
EAR simply by being outside of the United States, out of the jurisdic-
tion of U.S. courts. Though it remains to be seen whether an American
based United States person who controls in fact a United States person
located outside the United States may be penalized for violations com-
mitted by its controlled-in-fact foreign United States person, the threat
of revocation of the export privileges of the foreign United States per-
son is very real and convincingly coercive.
Judicial review of enforcement decisions of the Commerce De-
partment depends on the action taken. If the Commerce Department
administratively assesses a monetary civil penalty, it can collect the
penalty by suing for enforcement in any federal district court having
personal jurisdiction over the alleged violator. In such a suit all issues
upon which liability is predicated are tried de novo, thus availing the
alleged violator of an opportunity for judicial review.'78
Judicial review of other administrative actions is somewhat un-
clear. As a general proposition, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) 179 is inapplicable to rules, regulations, and orders issued pursu-
ant to the Export Administration Act.'8 0 Administrative enforcement
proceedings must comply with those sections of the APA regarding ad-
versarial proceedings,8 " but the section of the APA regarding the stan-
dard of review of administrative actions is expressly inapplicable.18 2
While this does not imply that judicial review is unavailable, the re-
viewing standards may remain a mystery for some time.
IV. AN OUTLINE OF THE ANTIBOYCOTT SECTIONS OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The antiboycott sections added to the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) by the TRA are as tantalizingly elusive as the EAR. To avoid
doubling the length of this article, however, the following explanation
177. 15 C.F.R. § 388.1(a) (1979).
178. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2405(f) (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 11(0, 93 Stat. 503 (1979)).
179. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1976).
180. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2407 (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 13(a), 93 Stat. 503 (1979)).
181. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2405(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 1 1(c)(2)(B), 93 Stat. 503 (1979)).
182. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2407 (Supp. 1979) (reinacted, Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 13(a), 93 Stat. 503 (1979)).
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is in outline form. Readers interested in greater detail may refer to any
of the explanations that have been published, including this author's
article, International Boycott Rules-Identication of Problems.183
A. Thresholds
1. There are no jurisdictional requirements as such. Any U.S.
taxpayer who has foreign tax credits, DISC benefits, or who is
a "United States shareholder" of a "controlled foreign corpo-
ration" may lose tax benefits.
2. The key to the loss of tax benefits is "participation in or coop-
eration with an international boycott."'' 8 4
3. The participation or cooperation may be committed by the
U.S. taxpayer, any member of the same "controlled group,"'8"
or by any other person whose activities produce foreign tax
benefits for the United States taxpayer.
B. Participation in or Cooperation with an International Boycott
1. Agreements are the sole events of significance; actual partici-
pation or cooperation is relevant only insofar as it supports the
inference of the existence of an agreement.
2. A person participates in or cooperates with an international
boycott by entering one or more of five specified types of
agreements. They are:
(a) Agreements to refrain from doing business with or in the
boycotted country or with the government, companies or nationals of
the boycotted country.186
(b) Agreements to refrain from doing business with a United
States person 8 7 engaged in trade in the boycotted country or with the
government, companies or nationals of the boycotted country (for con-
venience, such United States persons are referred to as "black-
listed").'
(c) Agreements to refrain from doing business with compa-
nies owned or managed by persons of a particular race, religion, or
nationality, or to remove or refrain from selecting corporate directors
183. [1978] TAx MNGM'T (BNA) Memorandum 78-10.
184. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3).
185. As defined in I.R.C. § 993(a)(3).
186. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(i).
187. As defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30).
188. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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of a particular race, religion or, nationality.189
(d) Agreements to refrain from employing persons of a par-
ticular race, religion, or nationality. 190
(e) Agreements made by the seller of goods to a boycotting
buyer to refrain from shipping the goods on blacklisted carriers or in-
suring the goods with blacklisted insurers.' 91
3. These agreements must be made "as a condition of doing busi-
ness directly or indirectly within a [boycotting] country or with
the government, a company, or a national of a [boycotting]
country' 192 or, in the case of the fifth type, made as a condi-
tion of the sale of the goods. 19
3
4. Agreements are inferred from conduct. They need not be ex-
plicit and need not be in writing. Generally, furnishing infor-
mation does not support the inference of an agreement, unless
the information is furnished in exchange for some present eco-
nomic benefit, or unless the furnishing of information is ac-
companied by conduct suggesting the existence of an
agreement. Some examples:
(a) A letter of credit is deemed part of the underlying con-
tract, even if it is issued some time after the contract is executed.' 94 A
certification that the goods are not made by a blacklisted company
manifests, then, a prior agreement to refrain from buying goods from a
blacklisted company. A certification that the beneficiary is not black-
listed manifests an agreement to do nothing that can cause it to become
blacklisted, such as dealing with Israel.
(b) A bank makes an agreement by implementing (excludes
advising) a letter of credit containing conditions with which the benefi-
ciary may not comply without being considered to have participated or
cooperated. It is seen as agreeing to refrain from doing business with
beneficiaries that cannot or will not supply certifications. This applies
only if the beneficiary is in the protected class: United States persons,
boycotted country persons, or persons unable to certify due to reason of
race, religion, or nationality. 195
189. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(iii).
190. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(iv).
191. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(B).
192. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A).
193. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(B).
194. New Boycott Guideline H-8, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3463 (1978).
195. New Boycott Guideline H-29A, H-29B, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3465 (1978).
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(c) A certification, during pre-contract negotiations, that the
United States seller is not blacklisted is not an agreement. An under-
taking to recertify at a later date is an agreement. 196
(d) Furnishing a certificate to customs officials at the time of
import that goods are not made by blacklisted manufacturers is not an
agreement. Undertaking in advance to provide such a certificate is an
agreement. 197
(e) If a contract provides that local law "applies," there is no
agreement. 198 If the contractor agrees to "comply" with local law and
local law includes boycott requirements, there is an agreement. 199
5. The agreement must generally be made as a condition of do-
ing business with or in the boycotting country or with its gov-
ernment, companies or nationals, directly or indirectly.
(a) A shipowner may require a charterer to avoid ports of the
boycotted country. The agreement is not a condition of doing business
with the government, companies, or nationals of the boycotting coun-
try.20
0
(b) If a United States seller of goods to a boycotting country
buyer asks and a United States manufacturer agrees to purchase raw
materials from a non-blacklisted United States persons, both have
made an agreement.20'
6. The agreement must generally be to refrain from doing busi-
ness with persons in the protected class.
(a) A bank is not doing business with a company whose se-
curities the bank trades on secondary markets.20 2
(b) A bank is doing business with companies whose securi-
ties the bank purchases directly from the companies.20 3
(c) Thus, banks that administer portfolios for boycotting
country persons and have authority to purchase original issues partici-
pate or cooperate if they agree to refrain from purchasing from black-
listed companies, boycotted country companies, or companies whose
196. New Boycott Guideline H-17, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3464 (1978).
197. New Boycott Guideline H-32, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3465 (1978).
198. New Boycott Guideline H-3, H-7, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3462, 3463 (1978).
199. New Boycott Guideline H-4, H-7, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3463 (1978).
200. New Boycott Guideline H-27, H-28, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3465 (1978).
201. New Boycott Guideline H-34, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3465 (1978).
202. New Boycott Guideline J-5, J-6A, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3466 (1978).
203. New Boycott Guideline J-6B, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3466 (1978).
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owners or manufacturers are of a particular race, religion, or national-
ity.
7. Agreements designed to protect the boycotting country buyer
from war risks or risks of confiscation of goods are permit-
ted.204
C. Exceptions
1. There are three exceptions. The following agreements may be
made with no tax penalty:
(a) Agreements to support U.S. sanctioned boycotts, such as
the U.S. boycott of Rhodesia.20 5
(b) Agreements to comply with requirements prohibiting the
import of goods from the boycotted country into the boycotting coun-
try.206
(c) Agreements to comply with requirements prohibiting the
export of goods from the boycotting country to the boycotted coun-
try.207
2. The import exception only covers goods imported from the
boycotted country. It does not (unlike the EAR) cover serv-
ices. It also does not (unlike the EAR) permit agreements to
refrain from importing goods from locations outside the boy-
cotted country, even if the goods are manufactured by compa-
nies of the boycotted country.
D. Calculation of Tax Penalties
1. International Boycott Factor (IBF)--the IBF is a fraction that
reflects boycott-tainted operations as a percentage of world-
wide foreign operations."0 8
(a) The numerator reflects purchases, sales, and payrolls
from all boycott-tainted operations.
(b) The denominator reflects purchases, sales, and payrolls
from all foreign operations.
(c) The IBF is multiplied by the foreign tax credit otherwise
204. New Boycott Guideline M-5, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3468 (1978).
205. I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(A).
206. I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(B).
207. I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(C).
208. I.R.C. § 999(c)(1), See T.D. 7467, 1977-1 C.B. 243.
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allowable. The result is the tax credit disallowance. 20 9
(d) The IBF is multiplied by the non-Subpart F income of all
"controlled foreign corporations" of which the taxpayer is a "United
States shareholder." The result is additional Subpart F income.210
(e) The IBF is multiplied by the DISC deferral and the result
is additional income deemed distributed to the DISC's shareholders.2 1'
2. Specific Attribution Method
(a) This is an alternative to the IBF method. It may be
elected by a taxpayer at its option in any taxable year.212
(b) To apply this method, the taxpayer identifies specific op-
erations and traces the income earned and foreign taxes paid. All in-
come earned from tainted operations is recognized as additional
Subpart F income or DISC income, and all foreign tax credits arising
from tainted operations are lost.213
3. Determination of Tainted Operations
(a) Whichever method of calculating tax benefits lost is used,
it is presumed by statute that all operations by all members of the same
"controlled group" in the same country and in all other countries that
support the same boycott are tainted if any such operation is tainted.21 4
(b) The presumption may be overcome. The taxpayer must
clearly demonstrate that "a particular operation is a clearly separate
and identifiable operation from the operation in connection with which
the agreement was made, and that no agreement constituting participa-
tion in or cooperation with an international boycott applied to, or was
made in connection with, such separate and identifiable operation. '21 5
(c) Operations to which the presumption does not apply-
including operations "related to" a boycotting country or its govern-
ment, companies, or nationals-are evaluated on a case by case ba-
sis.21
6
(d) The countries that have joined in the boycott of Israel are
209. I.R.C. § 908(a).
210. I.R.C. § 952(a)(3).
211. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F).
212. I.R.C. § 999(c)(2).
213. New Boycott Guideline F-8, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3462 (1978).
214. I.R.C. § 999(b)(1).
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Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic,
and Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen.217 However, the statu-
tory presumption also applies to non-listed countries that require par-
ticipation in or cooperation with the boycott.
E. Reporting Requirements
1. IRS Form 5713 is filed as part of the annual tax return.
2. The following persons must fie the report:
(a) A United States person with operations in or related to a
boycotting country.
(b) A United States person that is a member of a "controlled
group" any member of which has operations in or related to a boycott-
ing country.
(c) A "United States shareholder" of a foreign corporation
(whether or not it is a controlled foreign corporation) that has opera-
tions in or related to a boycotting country.
(d) A United States person who is a partner of a partnership
that has operations in or related to a boycotting country.
(e) A United States person treated as the owner of a trust
that has operations in or related to a boycotting country.
(f) A person not a United States person who otherwise meets
the above requirements and who claims a foreign tax credit or owns
stock of a DISC.
(g) A person in control (as determined under Code Section
304(c)) of a corporation that has operations in or related to a boycotting
country must report for the corporation, and the corporation must re-
port for the person.218
3. A boycotting country is one listed by the Treasury or that
otherwise requires participation or cooperation. The listed
countries are specified above.
4. The following information must be reported.
(a) All operations in or related to boycotting countries.
(b) All requests for participation in or cooperation with an
international boycott.
(c) All participation in or cooperation with an international
217. 44 Fed. Reg. 57001 (1979).
218. New Boycott Guideline A-1, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454 (1978).
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boycott.2 19
5. Waivers of Reporting Requirements.
(a) Requests for participation or cooperation need not be re-
ported if they are neither solicited nor responded to in any manner.220
(b) Operations "related to" a boycotting country need not be
reported if the person having the operation neither receives a request to
participate in or cooperate with an international boycott and if the fa-
cilitation of participation or cooperation by someone else is not a prin-
cipal purpose of the operation."2' An operation "related to" a
boycotting country is one
carried on outside a boycotting country for the government, a
company, or a national of a non-boycotting country if the per-
son having the operation knows or has reason to know that
the specific goods, services or funds produced by the opera-
tion are intended for use in a boycotting country, for use by or
the benefit of the government, a company or a national of a
boycotting country, or use in forwarding or transporting to a
boycotting country.
2 22
(c) Incidental contacts-an operation "with" the govern-
ment, companies, or nationals of a boycotting country need not be re-
ported if.
(i) all aspects of the operation take place outside the boy-
cotting country;
(ii) no request to participate or cooperate is received;
(iii) the person does not participate or cooperate; and
(iv) either (A) the value of property or funds involved is less
than $5,000 or (B) the operation does not involve the importa-
tion of goods or services into the boycotting country.223
(d) Other waivers are provided by the Treasury, chiefly to
ease reporting requirements for controlled groups and large partner-
ships, and are included in Part A of the Guidelines.
219. I.R.C. § 999(a).
220. New Boycott Guideline A-15, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3456 (1978).
221. New Boycott Guideline A-1l, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3455 (1978).
222. New Boycott Guideline B-i, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3458 (1978).
223. New Boycott Guideline A-20, 43 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3457 (1978).
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6. Criminal Penalty
Code Section 999(f) provides for a criminal penalty of up to $25,000
and/or one year in jail for willful failure to adhere to the reporting
requirements.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FORMULATING A COMPLIANCE SYSTEM
Perhaps the greatest error that can be committed in the develop-
ment of a compliance system is over-explanation. Upon reflection, the
attorney will realize that the compliance system must serve a deterrent,
not educational, purpose. It is enough to train employees to stop dead
in their tracks when an antiboycott law problem arises. They need not
be trained to solve the problem, nor need they be trained to understand
why the problem exists.
With this in mind, any information the attorney prepares for dis-
tribution to a client's employees should have three essential characteris-
tics: simplicity, clarity, and brevity. The information must be simple,
or it will either confuse employees or instill in them a false sense of
security. It must be clear, for reasons too obvious to recite. It must be
brief, or it will be ignored.
Clarity and brevity are primarily the products of good writing.
Constant redrafting, solicitation of constructive criticism, and empathy
for the readers' perspectives all contribute to these essential qualities.
Simplicity may be the hardest of the goals to achieve. These are no
consistent rules, but here are a few observations.
First, simplicity is enhanced in direct proportion to the amount of
inessential information omitted. Is it necessary to explain to a shipping
clerk for an Oklahoma corporation that his employer is a "United
States person," having first laboriously defined the term? Of course
not. "You are subject to this law" is quite sufficient. It is equally ludi-
crous to imbue the shipping clerk with an academic appreciation of the
breadth of the "interstate or foreign commerce of the United States."
The shipping clerk should know, on the other hand, that negative
certificates of origin are prohibited, that certificates using blacklisting
or exclusionary language are prohibited, and that certifications con-
cerning the registry, ownership, or routes of vessels should be brought
to the attention of a supervisor competent to evaluate their conse-
quences under the antiboycott laws.
Second, simplicity is enhanced in direct proportion to the number
of provisos deleted from an explanation. The problem with provisos is
1979]
47
Dubin: A Journey through the Antiboycott Laws
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
that they demand too much thought from employees who should be
trained to react, not evaluate.
Examine this sentence: "No information may be conveyed about
the company's business relationships in Israel, provided, however, that
normal business information may be conveyed in a commercial con-
text." The sentence is complete but the idea is not, and the employee
must reflect further to comprehend the instructions. The proviso, nev-
ertheless, is significant. Instead of omitting it, rephrase it, with a proper
foundation. Early in the explanation, the writer should explain the
rudiments of an international boycott and the dependency of a boycott
on information about business relationships of various companies.
Equipped with a basic appreciation of the goals of the antiboycott laws,
the employee can understand this:
In general you may not answer questions about the com-
pany's business in Israel. Sometimes, though, you will be
asked general questions about the company's business. If
your answer would reveal whether or not the company has
done business in Israel, ask yourself why the question was
asked. If you believe the person who asked the question only
wants to determine the company's competence, you may an-
swer. Do not answer if you even suspect the person is trying
to find out if the company has done business in Israel.
Granted, it is not brief, but it is simple and will produce the desired
result.
Checklists and explanatory guidebooks are two of the most useful
documents that can be prepared. Checklists should be distributed to
employees who deal with standard forms on a regular basis. Explana-
tory guidebooks should be dispensed to executives and other employ-
ees, such as salespersons, who must react, often intuitively, to less
structured situations.
Checklists are probably the more difficult of the two to prepare.
Ideally, a checklist should be completely unambiguous and require no
effort to apply. A series of closed-end questions will suffice, but the
series must be comprehensive.
In preparing a checklist for the evaluation of letters of credit, for
example, imagine every conceivable way a letter of credit might require
the recipient to report to the Commerce Department. List each possi-
bility in the form of a question asking for a yes or no answer. Instruct
the employee who reviews letters of credit to complete the checklist for
each credit. If all the answers are negative, further review will be un-
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necessary. If any answer is affirmative, the employee will refer the let-
ter of credit for review by the attorney.
Guidebooks, on the other hand, should acquaint the employees
with the antiboycott laws in a very general manner. Adopt a conserva-
tive approach. Do not indulge in a lengthy exposition on the require-
ments of, for example, the unilateral and specific selection exception.
Inform the salespersons that requests by Arab buyers for specific
brands of goods may be boycott-based. Sensitive to this possibility, the
salespersons will know to refer these requests to the attorney for review
and will be able to respond diplomatically to the prospective customer.
This approach may frustrate field personnel, because they may ini-
tially resent being forced to frequently contact the attorney for assist-
ance. There is no cure for the problem but there is a palliative. The
attorney should be available and prepared. The attorney should have
checklists available, so that most inquiries can be handled quickly.
49
Dubin: A Journey through the Antiboycott Laws
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
